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The European Parliament is a remote institution. Few voters (or 
political scientists for that matter) know very much about its powers, 
functions or composition. Unsurprisingly, the most striking feature of 
British elections to the Parliament so far has been the low turnout of voters 
- lower even than in local council elections. Nonetheless, the 1989 
European elections provided an opportunity for voters to indicate their 
current attitudes towards the parties and a chance for commentators to 
assess the state of political opinion among the volatile Scottish electorate. 
In this brief account of the elections we first present a short description and 
analysis of the results in the eight Scottish Euro-constituencies and then go 
on to review the progress and prospects of the various parties in Scotland. 
The Results 
(i) Turnout 
Turnout in Scotland increased sharply as compared with the last Euro-
elections in 1984, from just over 33% to 41%. Even so, this still leaves 
participation by the electorate at a lower level than that normally achieved 
in local elections, but turnout in Scotland was significantly higher than the 
37% for the UK as a whole. 
Without detailed survey evidence it is difficult to say why turnout 
improved. It may have been the product of a slightly greater interest in the 
EEC as an institution but probably more important were the facts that there 
were more candidates standing in 1989 than previously, that Labour sought 
to make the election into a vote of no confidence in an unpopular 
government and that the SNP were experiencing a period of increased 
popularity in opinion polls, thus raising the political temperature in 
Scotland. 
Turnout increased in every constituency, the sharpest rise being in 
Glasgow (10.3 percentage points) and the smallest in the Highlands and 
Islands (2.5). Variations in turnout across constituencies were small, 
however. The highest (42.6%) was in Strathclyde West and the lowest 
(38.4%) in North East Scotland, which contains Grampian Region- an 
area of notoriously low turnouts in every type of election. 
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(ii) Party Support 
As Table 1 shows, Labour support in the election was close to that 
obtained in the 1987 general election, reaffirming the party's predominance 
in Scottish electoral politics. Labour gained the two seats previously held by 
the Conservatives and, in the words of a Scottish Labour MP, succeeded in 
making Scotland a 'Tory-Free Zone' in terms of European representation. 
The SNP sharply increased its share of the popular vote as compared with 
1987. At 25.6%, the SNP's vote share was the party's best performance in a 
Scottish-wide election since the October 1974 general election and was a 
significant advance on their 1988 District election result. They retained 
their one seat (Highlands and Islands) with a much increased majority and 
came very close to gaining North East Scotland. The Conservatives 
experienced yet another electoral disaster in Scotland, coming third in the 
popular vote and losing their two seats. An even worse disaster befell the 
SLD which plummeted from 19.4% (for the Alliance) in 1987 to a 
miserable 4.3% in these elections. The Greens appeared from nowhere, as 
it were, and overtook the SLD with 7.2% of the vote. This was a 
remarkable performance, but only half as good as that achieved by the 
Green party in England and Wales. 
Table 1: Distribution of Party Support 
Euro- General Euro-
election election election 
1984 1987 1989 
% % % (seats) 
Conservative 25.7 24.0 20.9 (-) 
Labour 40.7 42.4 41.9 (7) 
Alliance/SLD 15.6 19.4 4.3 (-) 
SNP 17.8 14.0 25.6 (1) 
Green - - 7.2 (-) 
Individual constituency results reflect the national picture. Table 2 
shows the distribution of votes in the eight Euro-constituencies. It is 
striking to note that the Conservatives failed to obtain even a third of the 
vote in any constituency. They gained only three second places and were 
relegated to third place in the other five seats. Labour, by contrast, 
obtained well over half of the votes in two seats and performed poorly only 
in the Highlands and Islands. In the latter seat, the SNP result was 
spectacular and, no doubt, reflects the personal popularity of Mrs Ewing. 
Otherwise, SNP support was relatively uniform across the country with the 
exception of South of Scotland, where they apear to have been 'squeezed' 
somewhat in what was widely regarded as a Conservative-Labour marginal. 
There were no bright spots for the SLD, but the heavily populated 
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derisory. The Greens' best performance, with more than 10% of the vote, 
was in Lothians. 
Table 2: Distribution of Party Support in Euro-constituencies 1989 
Con Lab SLD SNP Green 
% % % % % 
Glasgow 10.7 55.4 2.0 25.0 6.3 
Highlands & Islands 16.8 13.9 8.3 51.6 9.5 
Lothians 23.7 41.4 4.2 20.5 10.2 
Mid-Scotland and Fife 21.0 46.1 4.0 22.6 6.4 
North East Scotland 26.7 30.7 6.0 29.4 7.3 
South of Scotland 32.2 39.8 5.1 17.2 5.7 
Strathclyde East 11.4 56.2 2.2 25.1 5.0 
Strathclyde West 21.8 42.7 3.9 23.8 7.8 
Table 3 shows the changes in support for the major parties between the 
1987 general election and the Euro-elections. The Conservatives declined 
everywhere (from an already low base) except in the South of Scotland. 
Labour's performance was more up and down than the overall figures 
might suggest. While they advanced in four seats, they also lost ground in 
four, most notably in Glasgow where the SNP appears to have made 
inroads into Labour's (admittedly massive) support. The decline in the 
SLD vote was in double figures everywhere, although the massive drop in 
Highlands and Islands is explained by the personality factor already 
referred to. The swing to the SNP was not a localised phenomenon, 
however - the SNP vote rose significantly in every constituency. 
Table 3: Change in Shares of Vote in Euro-constitumcies 1987-89 
Con Lab SLD SNP 
Glasgow -2.3 -7.1 -11.7 +14.6 
Highlands & Islands -8.0 -5.1 -26.5 +32.2 
Lothians -3.5 +0.7 -16.9 +10.0 
Mid-Scotland and Fife -4.1 +3.3 -13.5 + 8.1 
North East Scotland -3.8 +3.9 -13.9 + 6.7 
South of Scotland +1.2 +3.5 -15.2 + 5.1 
Strathclyde East -2.9 -1.4 -12.2 +11.4 
Strathclyde West -3.9 -3.3 -14.1 +13.4 
None of the constituency results seems, on the face of it, to put any of 
Labour's Westminster constituencies at risk, but the swing to Labour from 
the Conservatives in the South of Scotland, although small, is bad news for 
whoever succeeds George Younger at Ayr, where the Tories hold the seat 
with a tiny majority. Likewise, the position of Michael Forsyth in Stirling 
must be in doubt given the swing to Labour in Mid Scotland and Fife. 
---
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Despite their improved share of the vote, it is difficult to see the SNP 
making gains in a Westminster election without a further surge in support. 
Their overwhelming majority in the Highlands and Islands is unlikely to be 
translated into general election victories. The SNP has won all three Euro-
elections in this constituency, but in 1987 they lost the only Westminster 
component of it that they held (Western Isles). 
The party which has perhaps most to worry about is the SLD. Despite 
what we have said about the peculiarities ofthe Highlands and Islands, the 
collapse of the SLD vote there does not augur well for the retention of the 
five Westminster seats that it now holds in that area; the decline in Mid-
Scotland and Fife brings into question it's hold on North East Fife. Even in 
SLD bastions in the Borders, the party looks fragile on the basis of the 
South of Scotland Euro-result. Nonetheless, the SLD can take comfort 
from the personal appeal of their Westminster MP's and their record of 
retaining seats against the odds. 
Review of Party Performances 
(i) The Conservatives 
The European elections came at the end of a dismal decade for the 
Conservatives. While their party nationally was celebrating ten years in 
government, Scottish Conservatives were forlornly defending the two 
European seats that they still held and hoping to stem the tide that had 
steadily eroded their position in Scotland. Table 4 charts the performance 
of the Conservatives in Scotland over the past ten years in local, 
Westminster and European elections. 
Table 4: Consenative Share of Votes in Scottish Elections 1979-89 
Regional/District General European 
Elections Elections Elections 
% % % 
1980 24.1 1979 31.4 1979 33.7 
1982 25.1 
1984 21.4 1983 28.4 1984 25.7 
1986 16.9 
1988 19.5 1987 24.0 1989 20.9 
In 1979 they had made something of a recovery to around one third of 
the popular vote in both the general and European election, but since then 
it has been largely downhill all the way for the Scottish Conservatives. The 
nadir (so far) was 16.9% of the votes in the 1986 Regional elections. 
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when they were reduced to holding only ten of the 72 Scottish seats, the 
Conservatives undertook a drastic reorganisation of their Central Office in 
Edinburgh. This included an attempt to revive and revitalise moribund 
local associations. At the same time, they attempted to go on the offensive 
in the propagation of policy - claiming that Thatcherism was good for 
Scotland, that its results were enjoyed by Scots as much as by others and 
that, indeed, Scottish intellectual and moral traditions were very much in 
tune with Thatcherism; it was even suggested that they, in part, inspired it. 
Adam Smith and Presbyterianism were invoked in confirmation of this. 
Mrs Thatcher herself paid regular missionary visits to the Scottish 
Conservative conference and continued to be acclaimed with undiluted 
enthusiasm and deference. She also visited the 1988 General Assembly of 
the Church of Scotland where she delivered her provacative and 
controversial 'Sermon on the Mound'. 
The combination of organisational reform and propaganda offensive 
had no apparent beneficial effects on the results of the 1988 District 
elections, but time was probably too short for that to be expected. The 
European elections were held two full years after the general election, 
however, and some positive result might have been anticipated - even if 
only a stemming of the anti-Conservative tide. 
Several factors militated against even this modest ambition, however. 
British-wide opinion polls showed that the Conservative government was 
losing popularity at a greater rate than for some years and that at the same 
time the Labour party (having completed its policy review and launched it 
with some success) was again accepted by the electorate as a credible party 
of government. Mrs Thatcher was seen by an increasing proportion of 
voters as fallible and her style, which had always been unpopular with a 
majority in Scotland, seemed to be a diminishing asset nationwide. Some 
government policies, such as the privatisation of water (although this did 
not affect Scotland) were apparently seen as unnecessary, undesirable and 
the product of extremist ideology. The government's. plans for the 
reorganisation of the National Health Service which were regarded as 
retrograde in England and Wales were even more unpopular in Scotland. 
The highly unpopular poll tax/community charge came into operation in 
Scotland just before the European elections and must have been a negative 
contribution to electors' view ofthe Conservative party. Devolution, which 
had been kept as a live issue by the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, was 
another policy area in which the Conservatives were out of tune with 
Scottish opinion. In order to justify their refusal to participate in the 
Constitutional Convention their anti-devolution rhetoric became even 
more strident. · 
To compound these difficulties, in the run up to the elections the 
Conservatives found themselves pushed into third place in popular support 
in Scotland. They came a poor third at the 1988 District elections and on the 
94 
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eve of the European vote a MORI poll in the Scotsman showed no 
improvement in their position. The SNP, having gained a very safe Labour 
seat at a by-election in Glasgow Govan, soared ahead of the Conservatives 
in the opinion polls and acquired the status of the major 'opposition' party 
(to Labour) in Scotland. Add to this, the unusual spectacle of the 
Conservative party divided on its approach to Europe and a wholly 
negative election campaign, and we find the ingredients for defeat. 
(ii) Labour 
In sharp contrast to the Conservatives, the Labour party was in the 
electoral doldrums in England and Wales throughout the 1980s and yet 
established itself, not without some minor setbacks, as the dominant party 
at all levels of elections in Scotland (see Table 5). In areas where local 
politics is conducted on a partisan basis Labour holds around 60% of all 
District and Regional Council seats; they won 50 of the 72 seats in the 1987 
general election; they now hold seven of the eight Euro-seats. 
Table 5: Labour Share of Votes in Scottish Elections 1979-89 
Regional/District General European 
Elections Elections Elections 
% % % 
1980 45.4 1979 41.5 1979 33.0 
1982 37.6 
1984 45.7 1983 35.1 1984 40.7 
1986 43.9 
1988 42.6 1987 42.4 1989 41.9 
Complacency is always a potential pitfall for the successful, but it must 
be said that Labour showed few signs of this as they threw themselves into 
successive elections with a determination to do even better. Whether it was 
complacency, tiredness or miscalculation that led to a slip up at the 
Glasgow Govan by-election in November 1988, when the SNP gained the 
seat in spectacular fashion, is unclear. But the loss of this seat was certainly 
a shock to Labour and the necessary lessons were quickly learned and acted 
upon. If some of the SNP propaganda after Govan was designed to panic 
Labour, it failed to do so. Post-Govan opinion polls which showed some 
loss of support and a surge for the Nationalists were calmly assessed and 
judged to be an inevitable, but relatively ephemeral, reaction to what was 
indeed a spectacular defeat. 
The sea change in Scottish politics, which some claimed to identify, has 
not so far occurred. Labour went about its business more or less as normal. 
This included participation in the Constitutional Convention and a renewal 
and strengthening of its commitment to devolution. The improved position 
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of the party in British-wide opinion polls must have boosted the morale of 
its Scottish activists after the Govan defeat. At last there were signs that the 
frustrations of a majority without power could be ended. It is true that a few 
voices were raised after Govan calling for more militant actions and more 
radical policies to defend and advance Scotland's interests, but the party 
was pretty well united on its Scottish strategy and policies. One dark cloud 
threatened Labour's calm. It had to face the prospect of a by-election in 
another Glasgow constituency, Glasgow Central, which was adjacent to 
Govan and was in many ways eerily similar. But Labour was clawing its way 
back up the opinion polls again and polls taken pecifically in Central 
seemed to assure it of success there. The decision to hold the by-election on 
the same day as the European elections was clearly designed to dilute the 
resources that the SNP could pour into Central and to ensure that in the 
unlikely event of a setback there, any adverse effect on the European 
campaign would be avoided. In the event, Labour held the Glasgow 
Central seat comfortably. 
As it did throughout Britain, Labour fought the European campaign as 
a referendum on the general record of the Thatcher government. From an 
electoral point of view this was clearly the right strategy, for a MORI poll 
published in the Scotsman in early June showed that the Community 
charge/poll tax, unemployment/industry and the Health service were the 
major issues that Scottish electors said they would take into account when 
deciding how to vote in the European elections. Individual candidates did 
pay some attention to the European dimension, but clearly the record of 
the government, and some of its more controversial policy proposals were 
exploited. As we have seen, the election results suggest that this approach 
paid off. 
(iii) The SNP 
The early years of the 1980s was a period of decline for the SNP but in 
the latter half of the decade they picked up considerable momentum (see 
Table 6). In the 1988 District elections the party overtook the 
Conservatives in share of votes and their triumph in the Govan by-election 
immediately and significantly boosted their position in the polls. The 
Glasgow Central by-election gave the SNP an early chance to raise their 
profile yet again. But things did not go all their way. It soon became obvious 
that Central was not to be another Govan. The refusal of the SNP to 
participate in the Constitutional convention resulted in a bad press and saw 
the emergence of internal divisions on the issue; and a late controversy over 
the fact that the SNP group on Tayside Regional Council voted with the 
Conservatives to privatise some council services (with a consequent loss of 
jobs) was exploited with some success by Labour, and was subsequently 
blamed by some SNP spokesmen for defeat in Central and the absence of 
gains in the European elections. It is difficult for the SNP to justify claims to 
be the heirs of the Red Clydesiders in Glasgow and at the same time present 
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a mildly left of centre or even mildly conservative image in those areas 
North of the Tay where it has the best chance of winning seats. 
In the late 1980s the SNP made much of Labour's apparent inability to 
obtain a majority in the House of Commons and of the pointlessness of 
Scotland electing 'feeble fifty' Labour MPs. By implication, this argument 
conceded that Labour had a natural majority in Scotland and when British-
wide opinion polls indicated a significant Labour revival the argument was 
somewhat undermined. 
Table 6: SNP Share of Vote in Scottish Elections 1979-89 
Regional/District General European 
Elections Elections Elections 
% % % 
1980 15.5 1979 17.3 1979 19.4 
1982 13.4 
1984 11.7 1983 11.7 1984 17.8 
1986 18.2 
1988 21.3 1987 14.0 1989 25.6 
These sorts of reasons explain why the SNP did not do as well as it 
might have hoped - certainly in the immediate aftermath of Govan. But if 
not gaining North East Scotland was a disappointment, the fact remains 
that these elections saw the best electoral performance ofthe decade for the 
SNP and they appear firmly in place as the second party in Scotland. 
(iv) The SLD 
The performance of the 'third' force in Scottish elections during the 
1980s shows clear signs of surge and decline (see Table 7). 
Table 7: Liberal/AIIiance/SLD Share of Vote in Scottish Elections 1979-89 
Regional/District General European 
Elections Elections Elections 
% % % 
1980 6.2 1979 9.0 1979 14.0 
1982 18.1 
1984 12.8 1983 24.5 1984 15.6 
1986 15.1 
1988 8.4 1987 19.4 1989 4.3 
Despite the complications of a four-party system the Alliance did well 
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after the 1987 general election. It might even be said that the SLD did 
relatively well in the 1988 District elections, given the trauma of its birth. 
But the failure of the party to consolidate its position and establish an 
identity in British-wide terms were reflected in Scotland. A very poor result 
in the Govan by-election was a bad blow to morale and another disaster was 
expected (and resulted) in Glasgow Central. There is little that is 
specifically 'Scottish' about the slump in SLD support although the 
availability of the SNP as an alternative for voters disaffected from the 
major parties makes the SLD's task that much harder. Following the 
European elections, the SLD was at a lower electoral ebb than the 'third' 
force had been at any time during the previous ten years. 
( v) The Green Party 
The Green party entered the European elections in force for the first 
time and were virtually ignored by commentators (including the present 
authors). Its predecessor, the Ecology party, fought only one seat 
(Lothians) in the 1984 European elections and obtained only 1.4% of the 
votes. In the 1987 general election ten Green candidates amassed a total of 
only 4,034 votes. In the 1988 District elections the Greens had thirty seven 
candidates who averaged 136 votes each. In these circumstances the 
relative success of the Greens in the Euro-elections is a major puzzle. A 
MORI poll in the Scotsman during the Euro-campaign showed that 9% of 
voters said that they would take 'the environment' into account when 
deciding how to vote. At this stage, however, we would go along with those 
who have interpreted the Green vote as essentially indicating disaffection 
from the other parties- in other words, a 'protest' vote. As such, we remain 
to be convinced that Green politics are, in any significant sense, here to 
stay. 
Prospects 
In a volatile, unpredictable, ever-changing political landscape it is 
foolhardy to make firm predictions from one election to another which 
could be as much as three years away. It is not, however, giving any 
hostages to fortune to say that the Conservatives have a mountain to climb 
if they are to regain a position of authority in Scottish politics. They are in 
decline at all levels and there is no sign that their slide is at an end. The 
Conservatives' problem is probably not that they are out of touch with 
Scottish opinion- they know only too well what it is- but that they insist on 
telling Scots that they are wrong and that the current brand of 
conservatism, so clearly a product of a South-East of England party, is what 
is required and really wanted in Scotland. The Scottish political culture, a 
combination of egalitarianism, collectivism and concern for the under-
privileged tinged with a mild form of nationalism, is not inconsistent with 
other cultural values like individualism and enterprise, but it does imply 
compromise and a broad consensus. Political cultures do change, albeit 
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slowly, and political parties can play a part in engendering this change but it 
is a long haul. There is more to changing a political culture than 'getting our 
message across'. The message may get across only too well and be rejected. 
No amount of party reorganisation, changes in personnel or social 
engineering (sale of council houses, privatisation, opted-out schools, 
changes in school curricula, social security changes and so on) can be 
effective if the general trend is clearly out of tune with the political culture. 
At present it is clearly the Labour party in Scotland, conservative 
though it may be in some ways (perhaps deliberately so), that is best in tune 
with Scottish attitudes and aspirations. So long as it maintains this position 
it is likely to remain the major political force. 
It might be argued that the SNP, paradoxically, are in one respect 
going against the Scottish grain. Scots have certainly strong feelings of 
national identity and even some nationalistic streaks, but this falls short of 
what is conventionally accepted as the form of nationalism that is required 
to underpin demands for political independence (even 'within Europe'). 
The SNP have altered some of their policies and may now be considered a 
left-of-centre, social democratic style party but the nature of their dilemma 
- the need to make electoral progress in both Labour heartlands and 
Conservative-held seats - tends to lead to a certain obfuscation of their 
position. While many of the SNP's policies are perfectly acceptable to large 
sections of the Scottish electorate, their major one - indeed, their raison 
d'etre - of independence, is not. The political culture cannot, as yet, 
accommodate it. It is conceivable that the Conservatives may adjust their 
policies for electoral reasons, but the Nationalists have no alternative but to 
attempt to change the culture in this important respect. This is a perfectly 
legitimate aspiration but again it must be seen as a long and arduous task. 
It is difficult to articulate a role for the SLD in Scotland. The 
establishment of a Scottish Assembly elected on the basis of some form of 
proportional representation could result in their finding a secure and 
distinctive place in Scottish politics, but otherwise the prospects are not 
promising. The future of the Green party is equally problematic. Much will 
depend on how other parties react to their advance in 1989. If the major 
parties adopt and act upon 'greenish' policies then it seems likely that the 
Greens themselves will continue to inhabit the political fringe. 
Only one thing can be said with certainty. The volatility and 
unpredictability of the electorate referred to above promises to make the 
next decade as interesting, and even exciting, for students of Scottish 
politics as the last one has been. 
John Bochel, University of Dundee, Dept. of Political Science & Social 
Policy. 
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